PROCEDURAL ANALOGY IN ECONOMIC PROCEEDINGS

Abstract

This article is devoted to clarifying the background and reasons for the appearance of procedural analogy in economic litigation in general and the practice of the Economical Court of Cassation as part of the Supreme Court in particular. The research of procedural analogy was carried out precisely in the historical context of the development of economic procedural legislation, so in this manner it can be traced how that an unacceptable phenomenon in the past has become almost acceptable. Moreover, the procedural analogy was considered so inadmissible during the previous editions of the Code of Economic Procedure of Ukraine that even obvious cases when it seemed that it could be justified were prohibited. Procedural analogy is not directly prohibited in economic procedural legislation, but there is no legal basis for judges of economic courts to apply it. However, this does not prevent it from being applied when it is desirable for the judges themselves and not for the participants of economic cases. So, the legislature should perceive the attempts to apply the procedural analogy as a threat to the economic procedural form. The legislature should not interfere in attempts of individual judges to misinterpret procedural rules. The question of the legitimacy of the application of procedural analogy by economic courts is no clearer than in courts of other jurisdictions. The future of the procedural analogy must be decided by the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, because cases of misinterpretation of the relevant procedural rules are com-mon to economic, administrative and civil proceedings. It was also mentioned a positive phenomenon in modern economic litigation - the anal-ogy of judicial practice. Economic courts have increasingly considered the case law of courts of other jurisdictions and are trying to follow it if such case law is relevant to circumstances of a particular case.